Estimating a Model of Qualitative and Quantitative Education Choices in France by Belzil, Christian & Poinas, François
 18‐908	
	
	
	
“Estimating	a	Model	of	Qualitative	and	Quantitative	
Education	Choices	in	France"		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christian	Belzil	and	François	POINAS	
March	2018	
Estimating a Model of Qualitative and
Quantitative Education Choices in France∗
Christian Belzil†
CREST, CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, and CIRANO and IZA
Franc¸ois Poinas‡
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole
March 26, 2018
Abstract
We estimate a structural model of education choices in which individu-
als choose between a professional (or technical) and a general track at both
high school and university levels using French panel data (Ge´ne´ration 98 ).
The average per-period utility of attending general high school (about
10,000 euros per year) is 20% higher than that of professional high school
(about 8000 euros per year). About 64% of total higher education enroll-
ments are explained by this differential. At the same time, professional
high school graduates would earn 5% to 6% more than general high school
graduates if they both entered the labor market around age 18. The re-
turn to post-high school general education is highly convex (as in the US)
and is reaped mostly toward the end of the higher education curriculum.
Public policies targeting an increase in professional high school enroll-
ments of 10 percentage points would require a subsidy of 300 euros per
year of professional high school.
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1 Introduction
We estimate a structural model of education choices which captures both the
qualitative and quantitative dimensions of education choices using French panel
data (Ge´ne´ration 98 ) on educational choice trajectories made in the 1990’s and
early career wages between 1998 and 2003. One specificity of the French system
is the existence of a professional track at the senior high school level (lyce´e)
and a technical track (BTS 1 and DUT 2) at the university level. These tracks
differ from the general track in the type of training delivered to the students.
The professional track provides training to acquire professional skills specific
to manual or clerical occupations (e.g. plumbing, butchery, logistics) and the
technical track teaches students technical skills (e.g. in commerce and sales,
agronomy, chemistry) to occupy technical support functions. All those who
have obtained a senior high school degree retain the option to enter general or
technical higher education at a later stage. By modeling all of these aspects, we
can separately identify the professional-general and the technical-general wage
differentials from their utility differentials and can also estimate the disutility
of switching tracks.
We use the model estimates to evaluate the cost of policies reducing the
general-professional net utility gap in order to increase professional high school
enrollments. Our paper therefore contributes to the structural literature on ed-
ucation choices, to the voluminous literature on estimating returns to schooling
and also to the public policy debate about the relative merits of general and
professional education systems.3
The main findings are as follows. Our structural estimates reveal that the
average utility of attending general high school (about 10,000 euros per year)
is 20% higher than for professional high school. This differential may be inter-
preted as an indication that general education entails a much higher consump-
tion value than professional high school. At the same time, professional high
school graduates would earn 5% to 6% more than general high school graduates
if they both entered the labor market around age 18.
Individual heterogeneity in per-period utilities of attending education is
found to be important but its distribution appears to be more compressed than
what has been estimated for the US.4 About half of individual heterogeneity in
tastes for schooling is explained by parental background while the other half is
explained by persistent unobserved heterogeneity.
Our model provides an explanation for why very few individuals switch from
professional high school to general higher education as we find that the switching
cost of entering general education is about 1340 euros per year and therefore
1Brevet de Technicien Supe´rieur
2Diploˆme Universitaire de Technologie
3In February 2018, the French government announced its intention to stimulate an increase
in apprenticeship enrollments (a subset of professional high school enrollments) with the in-
troduction of a monthly subsidy of 30 euros paid directly to apprentices. See “Apprentissage,
les grands axes de la re´forme” (in French), http://www.lemonde.fr, 9 February 2018.
4Keane and Wolpin (1997) is the seminal piece in the literature. The structural literature
is surveyed in Belzil (2007).
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represents a 20% reduction in the utility of attending general higher education
when compared with an individual graduating from a general high school.
As our model separates the qualitative dimension from the usual quanti-
tative approach to the return to schooling, we can also assert that the return
to general education is highly convex (as in the US) and is reaped toward the
end of the higher education curriculum. Indeed, the average return to general
higher education is about 7% per year of education but the marginal return is
practically 0 during the first 2 years. The total wage premium of a complete
higher education curriculum in the general track compared with a general high
school degree is about 34%.5
The convexity of the returns to higher education and the relatively high
utility cost of switching from the professional to the general track imply that
the option value of a general education track is much higher than that of a
professional high school degree. The discounted utility gain of a high school
professional education (measured until age 30) is found to be 7,715 euros while
the option value of a professional high school degree is practically 0.
Finally, we find that an increase in the per-period utility of attending pro-
fessional high school of 300 euros per year of attendance would be sufficient to
raise enrollments by 10 percentage points (from 28% to 38%) and would also
reduce high school drop-out by 3 percentage points (from 16% to 13%) and
higher education enrollments by 5 percentage points (from 44% to 39%).
Indeed, equalizing the net utilities of professional and general high schools
would dramatically reduce the incentives to attend higher education. Our es-
timates indicate that about 64% of total higher education enrollments are ex-
plained by the existing general-professional utility differential at the high school
level. Without it, only 16% of the population would enroll in higher education
(either general or technical). Interestingly, setting the utilities of technical and
general higher education to an equal level (while leaving the high school utility
differential unchanged) would reduce general higher education enrollments by 8
percentage points. As a result, about 75% of all higher education enrollments
would be in the technical track.
The remaining portion of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
discuss the related literature. In the following section, we describe the French
educational system in details. In Section 4, we present the data and the model
that we estimate structurally is presented in Section 5. The next section is
devoted to the main results.
2 Background Literature
Our paper contributes to the literature on education choices. A first generation
of structural microeconometric papers modeling education within a partial equi-
5While this estimate may seem much lower than most college-high school wage differential
reported for the late 90’s and early 2000’s in the US (usually between 70% and 80%), it is
important to note that most estimates reported for the US are obtained ordinary least squares
and do not account for selectivity.
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librium framework has focussed on issues such as occupation choices (Keane and
Wolpin, 1997), the decision to drop-out of high school (Eckstein and Wolpin,
1999), evaluating the impact of borrowing constraints on education (Keane and
Wolpin, 2001) or measuring the ability bias in the presence of a convex wage
schooling relationship (Belzil and Hansen, 2002). A relatively smaller number of
papers have modeled schooling and occupational choices within an equilibrium
framework. For instance, Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) and Lee and
Wolpin (2010) estimated equilibrium models of the labor market using aggre-
gate production technologies so to identify the major causes explaining changes
in the wage distribution and in employment patterns. Gemici and Wiswall
(2014) investigated movements in college major specific skill prices (especially
the sciences) and document the importance of changes in schooling cost and
gender specific changes in household production needed to explain changes in
major choices. All of those papers, except for Gemici and Wiswall (2014), use
the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (the NLSY79)
and naturally focus on the quantitative dimension of schooling. They therefore
ignore the qualitative aspects.
A second contribution is the estimation of the qualitative aspects of the
returns to schooling. This dimension has been neglected in the empirical lit-
erature. This may look surprising as in most western countries, educational
decisions entail a qualitative dimension. In the US, the qualitative dimension is
particularly relevant in higher education when individuals select a college major.
It is now widely recognized that the choice of a college major can have as much
implications for future earnings than the decision to invest in post-secondary
education. For instance, many US studies have reported that the wage gap
between science-engineering majors and humanities are virtually as high as the
wage gap between college and high school graduates.6
Although the distinction between professional and general high school tracks
has not attracted much attention in the US, some studies have attempted to
measure the differences in returns between tracks. For instance, Altonji (1995)
uses variation in the curriculum of high school programs across the US and finds
a small positive effect of taking more academic subjects in high school.7 Meer
(2007) estimates the impact of attending secondary vocational education on
income in the US. His findings are consistent with the presence of comparative
advantage in the type of tracking chosen by high school students.
In continental Europe, qualitative educational choices are particularly im-
portant as the general education system co-exists with an important professional
track. Indeed, the economic success of many countries is sometimes imputed
to an efficient apprenticeship or vocational school system. For instance, the
well developed German apprenticeship system is often praised an an efficient
method to annihilate youth employment. Some recent papers investigate track-
6In their survey of the literature on field choices, Altonji, Arcidiacono, and Maurel (2016)
report several descriptive statistics documenting wage differences between different college
majors. The choice of majors in France is analyzed in Beffy, Fouge`re, and Maurel (2012).
7Altonji highlights that his study contains several caveats that prevent drawing policy
conclusions.
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ing policies, and in particular how allowing students to switch tracks affect their
educational outcomes. Dustmann, Puhani, and Scho¨nberg (2017) exploit vari-
ation in age of school entry due to date-of-birth cutoff rules in Germany. They
find results consistent with the fact that allowing children to switch tracks dur-
ing secondary education compensates differences in outcomes attributed to the
age of children.8 De Groote (2017) estimates a structural model of track choice
in Flanders. He shows that policies that allow students to downgrade to a track
less intensive in academic training reduces grade retention and high school drop
out.9
Although France is known to favor an education system largely centered
upon general skills, it also provides professional opportunities both at high-
school and higher education (undergraduate) levels, but many policy analysts
claim that professional education is both under-developed and under-valued
while public universities tend to be over-crowded (Gary-Bobo and Trannoy,
2015). Indeed, the desire to raise apprenticeship enrollments recently expressed
by the French government is largely motivated by the large failure rates observed
in French universities.10 Our paper therefore contributes to the public policy
debate about the design of the French education system and specifically about
the relevance of investing in professional education.
3 The French Education System
Before presenting the econometric model, and discussing the main results, we
give a description of the French educational system. We focus on the role
of professional secondary education and technical early higher education. A
schematic representation of the education system is presented in Table 1.
The French education system is basically organized in three main levels: pri-
mary education, secondary education and higher education. All individuals are
enrolled in general primary education schools (e´coles primaires). After com-
pletion of primary education, which typically happens at age 11 for those who
have not experienced any interruption or any grade repetition, individuals enter
secondary education.
3.1 Secondary Education
Secondary education basically takes place in two different consecutive institu-
tions: colle`ge (called “junior high school” hereafter) and lyce´e (called “senior
high school” or simply “high school” hereafter). After completion of colle`ge
(normally around age 15), individuals choose one of the three types of lyce´e:
8Adda et al. (2013) have estimated a dynamic model of job mobility using a sample of
German youths who have attended professional education but they do not model education
choices per-se.
9Hanushek et al. (2017) investigate how employment rates differ with respect to the type
of education (general / vocational) received using data on 18 different countries.
10See “Apprentissage, les grands axes de la re´forme” (in French), http://www.lemonde.fr,
9 February 2018.
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6
general, technological or professional. The completion of high school delivers a
national diploma, the French baccalaure´at, comparable to the British A level,
that is necessary to enter higher education.
3.1.1 Professional High School
When individuals enter a professional high school, they can choose between two
different diplomas: a CAP (Certificat d’Aptitude Professionnelle) or a BEP
(Brevet d’Etudes Professionnelles). Both are professional certificates lasting 2
years. After completing a CAP or a BEP, one may continue to professional
high school and complete a professional baccalaure´at, which takes two years.
The curriculum in each of these diplomas is composed of a mix of training to
acquire general skills (French, mathematics, history, geography, physics, foreign
language, arts, sports) and training to acquire professional skills specific to a
chosen professional specialization (plumbing, butchery, bakery, logistics, etc.).
The share of professional training in the different programs ranges from 40 to
60%.
The objective of these professional degrees is to train individuals to enter
the labor market after secondary school in manual or clerical jobs.11 Individuals
who complete a professional baccalaure´at can also enter higher education. All
professional high school degrees can be obtained with an apprenticeship training
curriculum. When choosing this option, the student spends some time taking
classes and works for the residual time in a firm (with a very specific employment
contract).
3.1.2 General and Technological High Schools
Individuals deciding to enroll in a general or technological high school complete
a specific baccalaure´at at the end of high school. This usually takes three years.
The first of the three years is common between the two types of degrees and the
student chooses which type of baccalaure´at to study in the second year.
The general baccalaure´at delivers academic (general) education. Students
who enroll in this program choose a field of specialization after the first year
(sciences, economic and social sciences or literature). The completion of a gen-
eral baccalaure´at is usually followed by higher education in order to grant a
marketable professional qualification.
The technological baccalaure´at provides a mix of general training and techni-
cal training. Technical training focuses on a given field of specialization (sciences
and technologies for laboratories, sciences and technologies for management, sci-
ences and technologies for social and health services, etc.). The objective of a
technological baccalaure´at degree is to allow students to pursue education in
technical higher education degrees.
11After the completion of a CAP or a BEP, one has the possibility to enter another type of
high school (the technological one in most of the cases) to take the corresponding baccalaure´at.
This path also takes two years.
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3.2 Higher Education
The higher education system can be divided into three types of degrees. The
first type is short-duration technical diplomas (two years after baccalaure´at),
such as BTS (Brevet de Technicien Supe´rieur, taught in high schools) or DUT
(Diploˆme Universitaire de Technologie, taught in universities). These diplomas
are opened to a limited number of students and admission is granted through
a relatively selective process. The training delivered in these programs is spe-
cialized in a given field (commerce and sales, hospitality, hotel administration
and tourism, agronomy, chemistry, etc.) and the objective is to make holders of
these diplomas entering the labor market in technical support functions.
The second type is a general university diploma (requiring 2 years or more
beyond the baccalaure´at). Basically, a student completes a DEUG (Diploˆme
d’Etudes Universitaires Ge´ne´rales), which entails passing the baccalaure´at exam
and studying for two more years. Then, the student has the option to continue
so to obtain successively a bachelor (licence, three years after a baccalaure´at), a
maˆıtrise (four years after a baccalaure´at) and a master degree (five years after
a baccalaure´at).12 It should be noted that, in France, admission to a University
is unrestricted, conditional on holding a baccalaure´at of any type.
The third type of higher education consists of all diplomas that may be
obtained in grandes e´coles. These schools give high level qualifications (bac-
calaure´at and five years), mostly in the fields of engineering and management.
Admission in these schools is very selective.
4 The Data: Ge´ne´ration 98
Ge´ne´ration 98 is a large scale panel dataset based on surveys conducted in
France by Ce´req.13 14 It provides detailed information on the socio-demographic
background and employment characteristics of young individuals who left school
in the year 1998 and were interrogated in early 2001. Re-interviews have been
conducted for parts of the sample in 2003, 2005 and 2007. The aim of Ge´ne´ration
98 is to document many aspects of early labor market transitions. In particular,
Ge´ne´ration 98 provides information on spells of employment, unemployment,
and training experienced between school completion (labor market entrance)
and the date of the survey. Therefore, information on up to 10 years of the
generation’s working life is available and each period of employment is well
documented. The personal labor market history of survey respondents has been
reconstructed, month by month, during the observation period.
12This university system has been reformed in 2002, following the Bologna process (whose
goal was to standardize higher educational systems across european countries). In France, it
has consisted in the suppression of the DEUG and the maˆıtrise diplomas.
13French Center for Research on Education, Training and Employment.
14This dataset has also been used in Beffy, Fouge`re, and Maurel (2012) to analyze the choice
of the field of study in Higher Education and Belzil and Poinas (2010) to analyze differences
in schooling attainments and access to permanent employment between second-generation
immigrants and their French-natives counterparts.
8
Table 2: Summary Statistics: High School Exit
Drop-out from high school 16%
Graduate from a professional high school 29%
Graduate from a general high school 55%
Because Ge´ne´ration 98 is a national survey of those who left the educational
system at a particular point in time (1998), all individuals faced the same labor
market conditions after 1998.
The survey contains detailed information on the schooling paths followed by
the individuals of the sample. Indeed, the data contain the educational level
reached in 1998, the choice of high school (professional, technological or gen-
eral), the type of baccalaure´at passed and the type of higher education diploma
obtained (technical or general). Those data permit to reconstruct the individual
schooling decisions.
4.1 Education Trajectories
The initial sample, constructed using the 2001 wave, is made of 55,345 observa-
tions. From this initial sample, we removed 811 observations because of missing
variables that prevent reconstructing schooling trajectories. 1,442 individuals
are removed because of missing observed characteristics used in the estimation.
Our final sample of individuals is composed of 53,092 individuals.
In the data, there is a limited number of observations for technological HS
enrollees that would prevent to estimate precisely the parameters associated
to the full path of choices for individuals enrolled in this type of high school.
Therefore, in our analysis, we group general and technological high schools in
the same category. This choice is driven by the fact that the curricula are
much closer between technological and general high school as they are between
technological and professional high school. For simplicity of exposition, the
expression “general high school” refers to general and technological high school
in the rest of the paper.
Tables 2 and 3 give a descriptive statistics of some schooling decisions ob-
served in the sample. First, with respect to high school, we observe in Table 2
that the majority of individuals graduate from a general high school (55%).
This proportion is almost twice as high as the proportion of those who graduate
from a professional high school (29%). It can also be noted that a significant
portion of the population (16%) drops out before completing high school. School
drop-out behavior is therefore quite important in France.
We now turn to higher education outcomes (see Table 3). Higher education
entry rates are consistent with the possibilities offered by the different types
of HS regarding continuing schooling. 89% of individuals who graduate from
a general HS continue studying in higher education, while this proportion is
3% for individuals holding a professional baccalaure´at. Once individuals are
9
Table 3: Summary Statistics: Higher Education Outcomes
After After
general professional
high school high school
Higher education entry rate
Graduate from higher education 89% 3%
Stop schooling after high school 21% 97%
Higher education exit level (conditional on higher education entry)
General early higher education graduate (baccalaure´at and 2 years) 6% 7%
Technical early higher education graduate (baccalaure´at and 2 years) 38% 81%
Intermediate higher education graduate (baccalaure´at and 3 or 4 years) 29% 10%
Advanced higher education graduate (baccalaure´at and 5 years or more) 27% 2%
enrolled in higher education, the vast majority of the ones who graduate from
a professional high school get mainly an undergraduate technical degree (81%).
Among the individuals who graduate from a general HS, 56% get an intermediate
or advanced degree.
4.2 Wage Data
We use wages reported in the first two interview waves (2001 and 2003). As
a consequence, we have access to panel data that cover the first five years of
individuals working life (from 1998 to 2003). We construct our panel by keeping
one monthly wage observation for each year from 1998 to 2003 for full time
employed individuals. Wages are expressed in 2001 euros. Observations with
extreme values of wages have been removed from the sample. Wage descriptive
statistics as well as the number of observations for each year are reported in
Table 18 in Appendix A.
5 Structural Model
5.1 Structure of the Educational System
We characterize the education system using three dimensions. One dimension
is purely qualitative and designates the education track (General, Professional
or Technical). The second dimension refers to the level of education (senior
high school level or higher education). Finally, the third dimension is the grade
level and refers to the number of years characterizing any track-level specific
combination. The notation is defined as follows.
• The tracks are: General (G), Professional (P ), Technical (T ). We treat
drop-outs (those who do not attend senior high school) as the outside
option.
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• The two levels are denoted as follows: Low (L) which corresponds to lyce´e
(senior high school) and High (H) corresponding to university (higher
education).
• The different grade levels are noted using numbers (1, 2, 3).15
It should be noted that Technical education (corresponding to BTS and
DUT ) is only available at higher level (first two years in higher education).
So, this means that there is no technical option at the low level. Similarly,
the professional track exists only at the lower level. So, to some extent, the
technical track plays a role similar to the professional track, but only at the
higher education level. General higher education incorporates different grade
levels (1 to 3). Those grades correspond to early higher education graduate
(DEUG), intermediate higher education (licence, maitrise) and advanced higher
education (master, doctorat).
5.2 Preferences
The per-period utility functions are meant to capture the consumption values,
net of direct costs, associated to each combination of track-level-grade. One
key contribution of our analysis is the incorporation of switching costs between
tracks. In order to capture the psychic costs (disutility) of switching educational
tracks, we let the utilities of early higher education in the general and technical
systems to depend on the track attended at the lower educational level (high
school level). Similarly, the utilities of intermediate or advanced higher educa-
tion in the general system also depend on the track attended at the early higher
education level.
As a general rule, we use a superscript s to distinguish per-period utilities of
school from employment and the remaining superscripts to index the tracks, the
levels and the grades. Each per-period utilities depend on observed heterogene-
ity, measured by a vector of characteristics Xi, and on an unobserved specific
taste for each specific educational sector {θGi , θPi , θTi }.
The list of observed covariates is composed by parents occupation, parents
country of origin, a dummy for living in an urban area, a dummy indicating if
the individual has been delayed at school before grade 6 and a gender dummy.
Summary statistics can be found in Table 18 in Appendix A.
We first document the notation for the utilities of attending senior-high
school (the low level). For those utilities, there is no grade dimension.16
15The level dimension is specific to higher education. No grade dimension is considered at
the high school level (see below).
16The outside option category (drop-out from high school) corresponds to decisions of stop-
ping education before completing senior high-school, whatever the number of years of educa-
tion completed.
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High school (Low level, L)
The utility of general education at high school (low) level is denoted
Us,GLit = Xiβ
GL + θGi + ε
s,GL
it .
The utility of professional education at high school level is denoted
Us,PLit = Xiβ
PL + θPi + ε
s,PL
it ,
where εs,GLit and ε
s,PL
it are stochastic utility shocks. Their distribution is docu-
mented below.
Finally, the utility of the drop-out (outside) option is set to 0.
Higher Education (High level, H)
The utility of attending general higher education (at grade 1) is denoted
Us,GH1it = Xiβ
GH + θGi + δ
G
P · 1(prof. high school) + δG1 + εs,GH1it ,
where 1(prof. high school) is an indicator equal to 1 when one has attended
professional high school. The parameter δGP is a utility shifter that measures
the disutility switching cost for those who started in the professional track and
switched to a general program. δG1 is an intercept specific to grade 1 in general
higher education.
The utility of attending technical higher education (at grade 1) is denoted
Us,TH1it = Xiβ
TH + θTi + δ
T
P · 1(prof. high school) + εs,THit ,
where δTp measures the cost of switching from professional to technical.
The utility of attending general higher education (at grade 2) is denoted
Us,GH2it = Xiβ
GH + θGi + δ
G
T · 1(tech. early HE) + δG2 + εs,GH2it ,
where 1(tech. early HE) is an indicator equal to 1 when one has attended tech-
nical education in grade 1 and δGT measures the cost of switching from technical
to general. Finally, δG2 measures the change in utility of attending a higher
grade level.
The utility of attending general higher education (at grade 3) is denoted
Us,GH3it = Xiβ
GH + θGi + δ
G
T · 1(tech. early HE) + δG3 + εs,GH3it ,
where δG3 (like δ
G
2 ) measures changes in utility when progressing to a higher
grade level.
εs,GH1it , ε
s,TH
it , ε
s,GH2
it and ε
s,GH3
it are stochastic utility shocks.
Finally, we assume that all the utility shocks are i.i.d. and follow a type 1
extreme value distribution (Rust, 1987).
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Employment
As was the case for the utility of attending school, each utility incorporates
a common superscript, w, and other superscripts for the track, the level and
the grade since it depends on labor market earnings which in turn depend on
schooling achievement, and on experience. Log earnings depend on individual
covariates Xi, on track specific unobserved heterogeneity and on accumulated
labor market experience (denoted exp).
Table 4 provides the list of the 11 final schooling exit states that we con-
sider. They are a combination of the terminal schooling level and the nature of
the diplomas obtained in the past. We assume that individual utilities are also
affected by random shocks, which we assume to follow a type 1 extreme value
distribution. Because we model the early phase of the life cycle, we treat earn-
ings as a deterministic component (from the perspective of the agent) instead of
introducing an additional stochastic term which would substantially complicate
estimation.17
The per-period utilities and associated wage equations are written as follows:
• Dropping-out from high school:
Uw,DOit = w
DO
it + ε
w,DO
it ,
wDOit = Xitφ
DO + expit · φDOexp + ψDO .
• General education at low level:
Uw,GLit = w
GL
it + ε
w,GL
it ,
wGLit = Xitφ
GL + expit · φGLexp + ηGi .
• Professional education at low level:
Uw,PLit = w
PL
it + ε
w,PL
it ,
wPLit = Xitφ
PL + expit · φPLexp + ηPi .
• General higher education (at grade 1):
Uw,GH1it = w
GH1
it + ε
w,GH1
it ,
wGH1it = Xitφ
GH + ηGi + expit · φGHexp + γG1 .
• Technical higher education (at grade 1):
Uw,TH1it = w
TH1
it + ε
w,TH1
it ,
wTH1it = Xitφ
TH + expit · φTHexp + ηTi .
17If we assumed that wages contain a stochastic term, we would need to simulate a large
enough number of random terms for each individual, each period, and each type. This would
render estimating the model much more difficult. This is achieved in Belzil, Hansen, and Liu
(2017).
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• General higher education (at grade 2):
Uw,GH2it = w
GH2
it + ε
w,GH2
it ,
wGH2it = Xitφ
GH + expit · φGHexp + ηGi + γG2 .
• General higher education (at grade 3):
Uw,GH3it = w
GH3
it + ε
w,GH3
it ,
wGH3it = Xitφ
GH + expit · φGHexp + ηGi + γG3 .
The unobserved heterogeneity terms ηGi , η
P
i and η
T
i represent unobserved
market abilities in track-specific jobs and are the market pendants of the vector
of unobserved taste for each specific track {θGi , θPi , θTi }. The parameters to
be estimated may be grouped as follows: φDO, φGL, φPL, φGH , φTH measure
the impact of observed heterogeneity on earnings for each education class and
ψDO is the intercept term of the drop-out wage equation. Finally, γG1 , γ
G
2 , γ
G
3
are parameters measuring the effect of grade level (within the higher education
general system) on earnings.
5.3 Observed Wages
To close the model, we assume that observed wages, w˜it, are measured with
error. They are the sum of a deterministic part, denoted wit, and which is
used by the agent to take decisions, and a measurement error term, denoted ˜it.
Formally, we have that
w˜fit = w
f
it + ˜
f
it for f = DO,GL, ...GH2, GH3 ,
where we assume that ˜fit ∼ N (0, σf ) and are independent across i, t and f .
5.4 Value Functions
Because the data do not allow us to observe discontinuous schooling-employment
patterns, we must assume that employment is a terminal state. The value
functions of the work options are composed of the sum of discounted expected
utilities of working assuming a constant earnings growth rate which depends on
educational outcome.
In order to characterize the value functions of leaving the educational system
for employment, we first set a terminal date, denoted T , corresponding to 30
years of age. As an example, this means a total time horizon of 14 years in total
for someone dropping-out from high school. To set the value functions, we use
the standard number of years of education to attain each education level (years
of education are shown in Table 4).
15
Value functions of entering the labor market
For each potential educational outcome f ∈ {DO,GL,PL,GH1, TH1, GH2, GH3},
we obtain a specific value function of leaving the educational system to work.
Because employment is a terminal state, the future components do not include
an Emax(.) term. The value function is denoted V w,fit and is given as
V w,fit = U
w,f
it +
T−df (t)∑
j=t+1
βj−1EUw,fij for f = DO,GL,PL,GH1, TH1, GH2, GH3 ,
where df (t) measures accumulated years of schooling by date t.
The value functions of attending education
The value functions associated to each educational sector-level-grade strategies
entails an option value of working next period or continue in education, except
for the value of attending general higher education in grade 3 which is the
highest level we model. With the distributional assumptions about stochastic
utility shocks (which follow extreme value type 1 distribution), the different
value functions may be expressed as below.
• Attending general higher education (grade 3):
V s,GH3it = U
s,GH3
it + βEU
s,GH3
i,t+1 + β
2 · EV w,GH3i,t+2 ,
where
EUs,GH3it = Xiβ
GH + θGi + δ
G
T · 1(tech. early HE) + δG3 + γ ,
and γ is the Euler constant.
• Attending general higher education (grade 2):
V s,GH2it = U
s,GH2
it + β · Emax(V s,GH3i,t+1 , V w,GH2i,t+1 ) ,
where
Emax(V s,GH3i,t+1 , V
w,GH2
i,t+1 ) = γ + ln[exp(V
s,GH3
i,t+1 ) + exp(V
w,GH2
i,t+1 )] .
For each potential educational outcome f ∈ {GL,PL,GH1, TH1, GH2, GH3},
V
s,f
it and V
w,f
it are given by
V
s,f
it = V
s,f
it − εs,fit ,
V
w,f
it = V
w,f
it − εw,fit .
• Attending technical higher education (grade 1):
V s,TH1it = U
s,TH1
it + βEU
s,TH1
i,t+1 + β
2 · Emax{V s,GH2i,t+2 , V w,TH1i,t+2 } .
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• Attending general higher education (grade 1):
V s,GH1it = U
s,GH1
it + βEU
s,GH1
i,t+1 + β
2 · Emax{V s,GH2i,t+2 , V w,GH1i,t+2 } .
• Professional education at low level:
V s,PLit = U
s,PL
it + βEU
s,PL
i,t+1 + β
2 · Emax{V s,GH1i,t+2 , V s,TH1i,t+2 , V w,PLi,t+2 } .
• General education at low level:
V s,GLit = U
s,GL
it + βEU
s,GL
i,t+1 + β
2 · Emax{V s,GH1i,t+2 , V s,TH1i,t+2 , V w,GLi,t+2 } .
As in Rust (1987), choice probabilities at each decision node obey the logistic
form. In order to build the likelihood function of observed education outcomes
and trajectories, we write down the probabilities of each schooling path chosen.
This set of probabilities defines all possible educational trajectories that the
data allow us to identify. To build the likelihood, we define a vector Hi that
records the highest grade attainment as well as all relevant information relevant
to individual trajectories. In Appendix B, we reproduce all choice probabilities
that are used in to obtain individual contributions to the likelihood and which
exhaust all possible outcomes for Hi.
5.5 The Likelihood
The contribution to the likelihood for an individual has two components: the
first component corresponds to the schooling decisions and the second part
corresponds to the wages.
For schooling decisions, the individual contribution to the likelihood is the
probability associated to the observed schooling path. This contribution, de-
noted Pr(Hi = hi), is built from the relevant transition probabilities and de-
pends onXi as well as on the vector of unobserved heterogeneity (θ
G
i , θ
P
i , θ
T
i , η
G
i , η
P
i , η
T
i ).
For observed wages, the contribution to the likelihood for individual i, con-
ditional on history hi, is given by
LW (w˜it | Hi, Xi, ηGi , ηPi , ηTi ) =
T∏
t=1
Pr(w˜it|Hi, Xi,, ηGi , ηPi , ηTi )1(eit=1) ,
where Pr(w˜it|Hi, Xi,, ηGi , ηPi , ηTi ) is the wage density at period t and eit is an
indicator equal to 1 if individual i is full-time employed at period t.
The total individual likelihood, conditional on unobserved type, is:
Li(Hi, w˜it;Xi, θ
G
i , θ
P
i , θ
T
i , η
G
i , η
P
i , η
T
i ) = Pr(Hi = hi|Xi, θGi , θPi , θTi , ηGi , ηPi , ηTi ) ·
T∏
t=1
Pr(w˜i,t,|Hi, Xi,, ηGi , ηPi , ηTi )1(ei,t=1) .
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The distribution for the individual specific unobserved heterogeneity is ap-
proximated with a discrete distribution. Therefore, assuming that there are M
types of individuals, each type m is endowed with the following set:
(θGm, θ
P
m, θ
T
m, η
G
m, η
P
m, η
T
m) for m = 1, . . . ,M ,
where the type probabilities are specified as logistic transforms:
pm =
exp(qm)∑M
m=1 exp(qm)
m = 1, . . . ,M ,
where qm’s are parameters to be estimated, with the restriction that qM = 0.
The mixed likelihood for an individual i is given by
Li(·) =
M∑
m=1
pm · Lim ,
where Lim is the likelihood conditional on type m.
The model is estimated by maximization of the sum of all individual log
likelihoods.
6 Empirical Results
As a first step, we estimated the model with 4 types (a relatively standard
number in the structural literature) and also considered larger numbers. We
found that the improvements in model fit beyond 5 types were marginal. For
this reason, we base our presentation of the results on the specification with 5
types. The discount factor β is fixed to 0.95.
The list of observed covariates, represented by the vector X in the model, is
composed by parents occupation, parents country of origin, a dummy for living
in an urban area, a dummy indicating if the individual has been delayed at
school before grade 6 and a gender dummy. Summary statistics can be found
in Table 18 in Appendix A.
The model with 5 types contains 191 parameters. However, and as is often
the case in complicated non-linear models, many parameters do not raise specific
interest. For this reason, we base our presentation mostly on simulations of a
large number of individual trajectories reflecting the distribution of types and
stochastic shocks and use simulated data to analyze the main properties of the
model. This sample constitutes our control group which will be used later to
evaluate the cost of raising professional high school attendance. All structural
parameter estimates can be found in Appendix C, Tables 20 to 25.
6.1 Model fit
In a first set of tables (Tables 5, 6 and 7), we compare predicted outcomes with
frequencies observed in the data. We investigate the capacity of our model to
18
Table 5: Predicted High School Graduation
Observed Simulated
Outcome outcome outcome
frequency (%) frequency (%)
Graduate from general high school 54.81 55.05
Graduate from professional high school 29.01 29.29
Drop-out from high school 16.18 15.65
Table 6: Predicted Early Higher Education Graduation
Observed Simulated
Outcome outcome outcome
frequency (%) frequency (%)
After a general high school
Graduate from general early higher education 51.58 51.12
Graduate from technical early higher education 48.42 48.88
After a professional high school
Graduate from general early higher education 12.65 11.00
Graduate from technical early higher education 87.35 89.00
fit high school choices but also the propensity to choose general higher educa-
tion vs. technical higher education among general and professional high school
graduates. This latter element is particularly important as one specificity of our
model is the allowance for switching from professional to general education.
First, and as is evident upon examining Table 5, the model predicts accu-
rately individual decisions about high school type. For instance, it predicts that
55% of our sample would graduate from general education and that 29% would
graduate from professional high school. These predictions are exactly equal to
actual frequencies.
The model is also able to predict accurately post-high school choices condi-
tional on the type of high school attended. As indicated in Table 6, the model
predicts that among those who continue beyond General high school, 51% will
obtain a early general higher education diploma (52% do so in the data) and
49% will obtain a technical early education diploma (48% do so in the data).
Similarly, the predicted choices of professional high school graduates who
have pursued higher education are also practically identical to the empirical
proportions. Our estimates imply that the vast majority (89%) would graduate
from technical higher education while only 11% would graduate from a general
higher education program. The empirical counterparts are equal to 87% and
13% respectively.
Finally, in Table 7, we report observed and simulated trajectories that cover
all possible choices in our model. There is ample evidence supporting the capac-
ity of our model to predict well infrequent trajectories such as those involving
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Table 7: Predicted Schooling Trajectories
Observed Simulated
Schooling Trajectory outcome outcome
frequency (%) frequency (%)
HS drop-out 16.18 15.65
General HS graduate 11.63 11.83
Professional HS graduate 28.04 28.32
General early HE graduate after general HS 2.53 2.52
General early HE graduate after professional HS 0.12 0.11
Technical early HE graduate after general HS 16.66 17.01
Technical early HE graduate after professional HS 0.85 0.86
Intermediate HE graduate after general HS and general early HE 9.96 10.13
Intermediate HE graduate after general HS and technical early HE 2.44 2.35
Advanced HE graduate after general HS and general early HE 9.78 9.45
Advanced HE graduate after general HS and technical early HE 1.80 1.76
Note: HS stands for “High School”, HE stands for “Higher Education”.
professional high school enrollment followed by a transition to the general or
technical higher education system.
6.2 Heterogeneity and Schooling Choices
In order to document the importance of heterogeneity in tastes and abilities,
we report average schooling attainments by types in Table 8. Type 2 (repre-
senting 11% of the population), type 3 (representing 5%) and to some extent
type 4 (representing 25%) individuals are those who are the most likely to at-
tend higher education. For instance, 89% of type 2 individuals attend technical
higher education while 50% of type 3 individuals attend general higher educa-
tion. Type 4 individuals either attend general higher education (40% of them)
or stop after professional high school (38% of them). At the opposite, Type 5
individuals (11% of the population) are very likely to drop-out or to terminate
after general high school, while type 1 individuals (48% of the population) are
likely to graduate from professional high school or to drop out.
6.3 The Consumption Value of Professional and General
Education
Using the structural parameter estimates, it is easy to calculate the average per-
period utilities associated to each choice. Obviously, the net per-period utilities
of attending school may depend on a large number of factors such as the psy-
chics costs of education, the non-pecuniary valuation of education or the direct
costs (transportation, housing, etc.) which cannot really be separated from each
other. The average per-period utilities are found in the first column of Table 9
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Table 8: Schooling Attainments by Type
Schooling trajectory Average Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
Fraction of each type 47.76% 10.58% 5.25% 25.35% 11.05%
HS drop-out 15.65 24.89 3.57 0.00 0.00 30.64
General HS graduate 11.83 1.82 0.00 14.93 12.27 63.96
Professional HS graduate 28.32 35.39 7.01 19.31 38.09 0.07
General early HE graduate 22.21 19.31 0.00 50.25 40.21 1.33
Technical early HE graduate 21.98 18.60 89.42 15.50 9.43 4.01
Note 1: Schooling choices frequencies are expressed in percentage.
Note 2: HS stands for “High School”, HE stands for “Higher Education”.
Table 9: Average Utility Levels
Average Average
utility utility
at school at work
(entry wage)
High school drop-out - 11.257
General high school 10.326 10.775
Professional high school 8.111 11.340
General early higher education (after general HS) 6.254 10.865
Technical early higher education (after general HS) 5.801 11.197
Intermediate higher education (after general early HE) 8.221 11.862
Advanced higher education (after general early HE) 4.746 15.186
Note 1: Average utility levels are expressed in thousands of 2001 euros per year.
Note 2: HS stands for “High School”, HE stands for “Higher Education”.
and are expressed in thousands of 2001 euros per year. It is informative to com-
pare them to the utilities of entering the labor market with the corresponding
qualification (found in column 2) and which represent the per-period payoffs of
the employment alternatives.
First, we note that the average utility of attending general high school (about
10.3 thousand euros per year) is 20% higher than the average utility of attend-
ing professional high school (equal to 8.1 thousands euros). This is essentially
explained by the fact that general education is more likely to contain a consump-
tion value. An alternative explanation could be that professional education is
viewed as a stigma by many individuals. By contrast, starting wages of a profes-
sional high school graduates (11.3 thousand euros per year) are 6% higher than
those graduating from general high school. This result is coherent with many
others reported in the structural education literature (mostly using US data)
that show the need for relatively high consumption values in order to rationalize
21
education choices.18
The per-period utility differential between general and professional atten-
dance may be particularly interesting in light of the debate regarding the im-
portance of the consumption value. In the structural literature, it is difficult to
separate from other elements affecting the per-period utility. However, in the
presence of two parallel systems which are both free of tuition (French lyce´es
do not charge any tuition), the utility differential may help identify the non-
pecuniary elements if one is willing to assume that other elements such as goods
and services consumption while in school and direct costs (such as transporta-
tion) are invariant to the type of high school attended. If one assumes further
that the consumption value is only present for general education, then one could
interpret the 20% differential as the share of the total per-period utility of at-
tending general high school explained by non-pecuniary elements.
Similarly, the per-period utility differential between general early higher edu-
cation and technical higher education, which is equal to 8% ((6,254-5,801)/5,801),
may also be explained by a higher consumption value for general higher educa-
tion at the upper level.
However, when compared to high school, the utilities of attending the early
phase of general and technical higher education are somewhat lower (6.3 thou-
sand euros and 5.8 thousand euros respectively). Because higher education is
also free in France, this reduction is most likely explained by a certain level of
disutility setting in when moving toward upper education levels. It is interest-
ing to note that entry wages representing the payoffs of the alternative option
(to work instead of attending higher education), and which are equal to 10.9
thousand euros and 11.2 thousand euros, are much higher than the per-period
utilities of attending education.
While the utility of attending the intermediate level is comparable to the
utility of attending general high school (8.2 thousand euros), the utility of ad-
vanced higher education is found to be very low (about 4.7 thousand euros per
year), especially when compared to its entry wage pendant equal to 15.2 thou-
sand euros. This is most likely explained by an increasing level of disutility
for higher education as one progresses from intermediate to advanced levels. In
turn, this disutility could reflect pure aging effects or heavier psychic costs of
educational investments when reaching advanced levels.
In Table 10, we report the average utilities of attending education for each
type.
The utilities are particularly dispersed at higher education attendance level.
First, the utilities of attending general high school range from 6059 euros for type
2 to 15,000 euros for type 3, while for professional high school, the range is from
4274 euros (type 2) to 11220 euros (for type 4). However, for general early higher
education, the lowest utility is 1980 euros (type 2) while the highest one is 10,934
euros (for type 3). It is interesting to note that type 1 individuals who represent
almost half of the population are endowed with an average utility almost equal to
18See Keane and Wolpin (1997) for a seminal piece. The structural literature is surveyed in
Belzil (2007).
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Table 10: Average Schooling Utility Levels by Type
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
Fraction of each type 47.76% 10.58% 5.25% 25.35% 11.05%
General high school 10.282 6.059 14.999 12.078 8.357
Professional high school 7.134 4.274 10.148 11.220 7.905
General early higher education (after general HS) 6.212 1.980 10.934 8.007 4.285
Technical early higher education (after general HS) 5.404 1.927 10.528 7.402 5.309
Note 1: Average utility levels are expressed in thousands of 2001 euros per year.
Note 2: HS stands for “High School”.
the population average (6,212 euros) and also that none of the types is endowed
with a per-period utility of education that is at least as large at the average entry
wage of high school graduates (about 11,000 euros). It is helpful to compare our
estimates to the distribution of the period utility of attending college reported
in Keane and Wolpin (1997). These authors essentially report that the felicity
of attending college is well above the average earnings of young American males
aged 18 for a significant portion of the population and also much below for
another significant share. This therefore suggests that the consumption value
of higher education is less dispersed in France than in the US.19
6.4 The Costs of Switching Tracks
One specificity of the French education system is that it is meant to facilitate (or
at least render possible) movements from one track to another. However, such
movements are relatively uncommon. For instance, and among professional High
School graduates, only 3% will eventually graduate from early higher education,
and they do so almost exclusively in a technical program. Movements across
tracks are substantially more frequent in higher education. Among individuals
who graduate from technical early higher education, 20% switch to general
intermediate higher education while 80% decide to enter the labor market.
Our model explains the relatively scarce movements from professional high
school to general higher education as we allow for an extra-disutility term affect-
ing the utility of attending higher education when coming from the professional
system. In total, there are 3 instances where switching costs may be acting.
The results, found in Table 11 indicate clearly the movement from a profes-
sional high school to general early higher education is by far the most costly in
terms of per-period utilities. Our estimate, equal to -1.34 thousand euros per
year, implies a 21.5% reduction in the utility of attending general higher edu-
cation for a randomly chosen individual who would have attended professional
19As an illustration, Keane and Wolpin (1997) report that the utility of attending school
may be as high as $15,000 for the high schooling types whereas the average yearly wage at
comparable age may be between $10,000 and $11,000.
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Table 11: Utility Shifts Induced by Track Switching
Parameter Percentage
Type of track switching estimate of utility
shift
Switching from professional secondary education -1.343 -21.48%
to general early higher education
Switching from professional secondary education 0.099 1.71%
to technical early higher education
Switching from technical early higher education -0.092 -1.11%
to general intermediate higher education
education. This essentially means that switching to a general track removes a
substantial fraction of the consumption value of general education.
Switching from technical early education to the general track (at the inter-
mediate level) appears to be costly as well, but much less than moving from a
professional high school. Its cost, which is about 90 euros per year, represents
only a 1.1% drop in the per-period utility of attending.
It is however interesting to note that moving from the professional track
to the technical early higher education track provides a positive shift of 100
euros per year and corresponds to a 1.71% increase in utility. This most likely
indicates that the professional high school academic curriculum is adequate to
permit the average student in the population to enter technical education.
6.5 Sources of Selectivity
One interesting question is to what extent individual heterogeneity is explained
by observed family background characteristics as opposed to unobserved het-
erogeneity. We first decompose the relative contributions of observed and unob-
served heterogeneity to the initial track decision. The results, shown in Table 12,
indicate that observed and unobserved heterogeneity are close to play an equally
balanced role as observed characteristics account for 52% of total heterogeneity
and unobserved heterogeneity accounts for 48%. However, it is equally inter-
esting to note that after conditioning on the initial track, the importance of
observed family characteristics practically vanishes as unobserved heterogeneity
absorbs more than 95% of the explained variations in education decision.
7 Measuring the Option Values of Professional
and General Education
The structure of our model allows us to measure two different components of
the returns to schooling. One component is qualitative since it attempts to
measure differences in wages explained by different tracks given the same length
24
Table 12: Variance Decomposition of Track Choices
Track choice Track choice
in secondary in early higher
education education
Observed heterogeneity 52% 4%
Unobserved heterogeneity 48% 96%
Table 13: Qualitative Returns to the Type of Secondary Education
Entry wages Wages 5 years after
labor market entry
ATE ATT ATE ATT
General high school graduate ref. ref. ref. ref.
Professional high school graduate 0.054∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Note 1: Standard errors under parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗ 10%.
Note 2: The returns are conditional on leaving school after high school graduation.
of education. The second refers to the classical return to an extra year of
education (given track) and is particularly relevant for the general track since
the professional track is short and leads to market entrance in young age. We
now analyze both.
7.1 Qualitative Returns: The Distinction between Profes-
sional and General Education
We define the qualitative component of the returns to schooling as the difference
in mean wages between professional and general education graduates who have
invested the same number of years. To obtain it, we therefore compute expected
wages conditional on stopping after completing the secondary level (around age
18) for both options. Differences in mean wages are therefore solely due to
the qualitative nature of the education curriculum. The estimates are found
in Table 13. Because our model allows for a causal effect of education on the
post-schooling growth rate, we present estimates obtained using entry wages as
well as estimates obtained 5 years after labor market entry.
Using simulated outcomes, it is also possible to differentiate between the
average return in the population (designated as ATE in Table 13) and the
average return for those having chosen the treatment (designated by ATT in
Table 13).
First, the positive estimate for the ATE on entry wages, and equal to 0.054,
indicates that conditional on stopping after high school, professional education
generates higher wages than general education. This may simply reflect the fact
25
that a general high school education curriculum builds up skills that are mostly
useful at stimulating subsequent skill accumulation but that are not highly
rewarded in the labor market. Note also that this positive differential is not an
artifact driven by selectivity since it is computed over the entire population.
After conditioning on professional education being the optimal choice, the
difference in mean wages of those who actually chose professional education and
their mean counterfactual wages had they chosen general education (the ATT)
is equal 0.062 and is therefore compatible with the existence of comparative
advantages. This essentially means that those who work after a professional high
school degree are better at performing tasks related to this sort of education
than the average person in the population.
Finally, it is also important to remark that the positive wage premium in
favor of those graduating from professional high school does not vanish once
post-schooling experience sets in. Both the ATE estimate (0.062) and the ATT
estimate (0.070) measuring the wage differential 5 years beyond labor market
entrance remain positive and indicate that professional high school graduates
still outperform general high school graduates after entering the market.
7.2 Quantitative Returns
Because professional education is terminal for most people who choose it, it is
more logical to measure quantitative returns for the general/technical tracks
only. As our model is meant to capture heterogeneity across high school tracks
but does not introduce additional heterogeneity for higher education, we only
consider average quantitative returns in the population and ignore the distinc-
tion between average treatment effects and treatment for the treated.
In order to compute those returns, we use general high school graduation as a
benchmark and therefore compare expected wages at various levels to expected
wages obtained upon general high school graduation. It is also important to
remember that there is a fundamental asymmetry between general and techni-
cal education in that technical education is only an option at the initial stage
of higher education while general higher education offers three distinct stages
(early, intermediate and advanced).
First, the results found in Table 14 indicate clearly that return to early gen-
eral higher education when measured at entry in the market (equal to 0.008)
is below the return to a technical degree (equal to 0.044) but exceeds it after
5 years. That is when incorporating differences in returns to experience be-
tween general and technical education, the benefit of a general early education
degree reaches almost 15% (the estimate is 0.146) while the benefit attached to
a technical degree is below 10% (the estimate is 0.093).
As is the case for the US, the returns to general education are highly convex.
The financial return to the first two years of general education is practically
equal to 0 (0.008) but completing a third year (obtaining an intermediate higher
education diploma) raises wages by almost 10% compared to a general high
school graduate (0.096). This implies an average return of 3% per year of
schooling over the first 3 years. However, completing 5 years has a significant
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Table 14: Quantitative Returns after General Secondary Education
Entry Wages 5 years
Educational outcome wages after labor
market entry
General high school graduate ref. ref.
General early higher education graduate (2 years) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Technical early higher education graduate (2 years) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Intermediate higher education graduate (3 years) 0.096∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Advanced higher education graduate (5 years) 0.343∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006)
Note 1: Standard errors under parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%; ∗∗ 5%; ∗ 10%.
Note 2: Years of schooling are indicated in deviation to high school graduation.
impact as the differential with a high school graduate raises to 34% (0.343).
Those numbers imply marginal returns of 12% per year of schooling over the
last 2 years. When averaged over 5 years, the return to general education raises
to about 7% per year of schooling and therefore reaches a value comparable to
those reported for the US (Belzil, 2007). However, it is clear that the financial
benefit of general higher education is only reaped at the end of the curriculum.
It is important to note that the returns to technical higher education are
reaped earlier than those of general education. The wage differential between
a person completing two years of technical higher education and a general high
school graduate, equal to 4.4%, implies an average return of 2% per year in the
early phase.
Finally, we find that a fair portion of the return to general education is
reaped in terms of post-education wage growth. After 5 years of experience,
those who have obtained an advanced higher education degree would earn 48%
more than general high school graduates. This means that after 5 years of
labor market experience, about 30% of the return to schooling is explained by
differences in the slope of early career age earnings profiles.
7.3 The Option Value of General and Professional Educa-
tion
The convexity of the wage schooling relationship (within the general track),
along with the relatively high cost of switching from the professional to the
general track, suggest that one major reason for enrolling in general education
in high school is a significant option value. To clarify this point, we measure
the option value associated to each type of school. More precisely, we compute
the difference between the lifetime utility gain (until age 30) of completing
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Table 15: Option Value of the Type of Secondary Education
Option value Option value
of of
general professional
high school high school
Total utility gain (consumption value of schooling and wages) 7.715 -1.334
Wage gain -15.282 -11.432
Note 1: Utility levels and wages are expressed in thousands of 2001 euros per year.
Note 2: The option value is calculated as the average difference in the sum of discounted
lifetime utility flows between individuals who stop schooling at the secondary education level
and individuals who stop schooling at a more advanced level (higher education).
professional education and the lifetime utility gain of entering the labor market
after professional education. We proceed similarly for general education. To
obtain a feeling of the importance of the consumption value of education, we
also measure option values after removing the schooling utility components.
This measure allows us to quantify the relative importance of forgone earnings
and especially to what extent individuals involved in higher education may
compensate the earnings penalty of education by subsequent higher earnings.
Not surprisingly, as shown in Table 15, the option value of entering a general
high school track is much higher than its professional counterpart. For the
general track, the discounted utility gain realized until age 30 is equal to 7,715
euros. This gain is however positive mostly because higher education generates
a consumption value. If we removed the utility components (affecting higher
education attendance) and measured the option value only based in realized
earnings until age 30, the option value becomes negative and equal to -15,282
euros. This is explained by the fact that by age 30, total lifetime earnings of
those attending university are still lower than those of high school graduates
who started to work at age 18.
The option value of attending the professional track is small in absolute
terms but actually negative (-1,334). When incorporating only earnings, it is
even more negative as our estimate is equal to -11,432 euros.
A similar computation maybe carried for the early phase of general higher
education and technical higher education as both of these choices offer the pos-
sibility to continue and reach higher levels of general or technical education.
Results are found in Table 16. As was the case for both general and pro-
fessional high school, the option value of entering general early education is
positive when incorporating the consumption value (4,417 euros) but becomes
negative (-17,692) when only wages are taken into account. It is interesting to
note that technical higher education entails the largest option values as the value
obtained from utility gains reaches 13,689 euros while the wage-based measure is
still negative (-8,608 euros) but smaller in absolute terms than those measured
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Table 16: Option Value of the Type of Early Higher Education
Option value Option value
of general of technical
early higher early higher
education education
Total utility gain (consumption value of schooling and wages) 4.417 13.689
Wage gain -17.692 -8.608
Note 1: Utility levels and wages are expressed in thousands of 2001 euros per year.
Note 2: The option value is calculated as the average difference in the sum of discounted
lifetime utility flows between individuals who stop schooling at the secondary education level
and individuals who stop schooling at a more advanced level (higher education).
for general high school, professional high school and general higher education.
8 Evaluating the Cost of Raising Professional
High School Attendance
We now turn to the following question: by how much should the per-period
utility of attending professional high school increase if public authorities wished
to raise professional high school enrollments by 10 percentage points? As already
mentioned, French students tend to favor general education over professional
alternatives. However, many policy analysts claim that professional education
is both under-developed and under-valued in France. There are good reasons
for that. Public universities tend to be over-crowded and a non-trivial share of
those entering general higher education drop-out without obtaining any diploma
(Gary-Bobo and Trannoy, 2015). As a consequence, tracking those students ill-
prepared for general education toward more applied education curricula may be
an efficient way to reduce youth-unemployment.
Although the level of the target is intrinsically ad-hoc, we choose a 10 per-
centage points increase because it would still leave higher education as the preva-
lent option. Such an increase would correspond to a movement from a 28% to
38% in professional high school enrollment rates. We are however agnostic
about the method used to achieve this increase. Obviously, an increase in the
utility of attending professional high school could be obtained by implementing
a subsidy or a cash transfer conditional on enrollment. Other methods, such as
public information campaigns and the like, could also raise the desirability of
professional education by reducing potential stigma attached to it.
To answer this question, we modify the distribution of the per-period util-
ities of attending professional high school by calibrating a shift parameter to
the desired enrollment target (38%). Although the utility gap between profes-
sional and general high school attendance was found to be as high as 2000 euros
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(Table 9), reaching a 10 percentage points increase would not require to close
this gap entirely. Simulated schooling choice frequencies, reported in Panel B
of Table 17, indicate that an increase of 300 euros in the utility of attending
professional high school would be sufficient to raise enrollments from 28% to
38%. They also indicate that an increase of 300 euros would reduce high school
drop-outs by 3 percentage points (from 16% to 13%). At the same, this realloca-
tion in favor of professional high school would be accompanied by a decrease in
higher education enrollments of about 5 percentage points (from 44% to 39%).
To illustrate the importance of the consumption value when choosing an
optimal high school track, we push our analysis further and answer the fol-
lowing question: How would schooling decisions change if both utilities were
equalized (while leaving the utilities of general and technical higher education
unchanged)? The resulting frequencies, reported in Panel C of Table 17, il-
lustrate the dominant role that per-period utilities play in schooling choices as
professional enrollments would go from 28% (the benchmark) to 72%. Equal-
izing net utilities of attending general and professional high school would also
practically annihilate the incentive to attend higher education as enrollments
would fall by 28 percentage points (from 44% to 16%). This may partly be ex-
plained by the convexity of the wage-schooling relationship for higher education.
Returns to higher education are reaped mostly after attending 5 years of gen-
eral higher education while returns to professional high school training exceed
those of general high school for those entering the market at 18. So without
a 20% differential in per-period utilities, about 64% of total higher education
enrollments (28% / 44%) would vanish.
A similar exercise may be performed with early higher education. Recall that
the average utility of attending general early higher education (6254 euros per
year) is about 8% higher than the average utility of the early phase of general
higher education (5801 euros per year). As shown in Panel D of Table 17, setting
both utilities equal (while leaving utilities of high school attendance unchanged)
would end up doubling technical higher education enrollments (from 22% to
39%) and reduce general higher education enrollments by 8 percentage points.
As a result, about 75% of all higher education enrollments would be in the
technical track (39% / 53%).
To summarize, either at the senior high school level or at the higher edu-
cation level, the decision to attend general education is largely dominated by
non-pecuniary dimensions. Without it, general education enrollments would
decrease substantially.
9 Conclusion
We have estimated a structural model of education choices in which individuals
choose between a professional and a general track using French panel data. As
is the case for the US, French education choices are also largely driven by non-
pecuniary elements and our estimates indicate that this is mostly explained by
the high consumption value of general education. Our findings suggest that pro-
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fessional education entails higher financial returns for those entering the market
around age 18, but that investing in general education offers an important op-
tion value which can only be reaped after 5 years of higher education. Without
a large positive general-professional utility differential, the incentive to attend
general higher education would be dramatically reduced as about 64% of total
higher education enrollments are explained by the existing general-professional
utility differential. We find that an increase of 300 euros in the net utility of
attending professional high school would be sufficient to increase professional
high school enrollments by 10 percentage points.
Our results also suggest avenues for future research. In our model, financial
incentives to invest in education are represented by differences in earnings (and
earnings growth) across educational outcomes. In actual labor markets, it is
conceivable that young individuals also base their decisions on unemployment
outcome differentials. This suggests that modeling earnings risk through dif-
ferential layoff probabilities or unemployment duration may be highly relevant.
This is an avenue for future research that we are currently contemplating.
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Appendix
A Descriptive Statistics
Table 18: Summary Statistics: Wage Data
Year Number of Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
observations
1998 25361 1091.39 333.66 646.00 3684.00
1999 22184 1096.12 318.90 646.77 3792.04
2000 17346 1105.94 344.81 646.71 3733.49
2001 39603 1225.03 425.28 646.46 3761.42
2002 5039 1139.68 351.22 647.66 3665.97
2003 2076 1113.66 334.64 647.25 3241.79
Total/Average 111609 1144.61 373.46 646.00 3792.04
Note: Monthly wages of full-time employed workers, expressed in 2001 euros.
Table 19: Summary Statistics: Observed Characteristics used in the Estimation
Variable Mean
Father’s occupation
Tradesman 0.1081
Executive 0.1723
Technician 0.0841
White collar 0.2655
Blue collar 0.2752
No occupation 0.0947
Mother’s occupation
Tradesman 0.0414
Executive 0.1020
Technician 0.0467
White collar 0.4818
Blue collar 0.1252
No occupation 0.2029
Parents’ country of origin
France 0.8016
OECD 0.0752
Non-OECD 0.1232
Urban location 0.7523
Late at school 0.2299
Man 0.5131
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B Choice Probabilities and Educational Trajec-
tories
As in Rust (1987), choice probabilities at each decision node obey the logistic
form.
At low level, we have the probabilities of choosing
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Conditional on graduating from general high school, we have the probabili-
ties of choosing
• General early higher education: P s,GH12,it =
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it
)
+exp
(
V
w,GL
it
) ,
• Technical early higher education: P s,TH12,it =
exp
(
V
s,TH1
it
)
exp
(
V
s,GH1
it
)
+exp
(
V
s,TH1
it
)
+exp
(
V
w,GL
it
) ,
• Labor market: Pw,GL2,it =
exp
(
V
w,GL
it
)
exp
(
V
GH1
)
+exp
(
V
TH1
)
+exp
(
V
w,GL
it
) .
Conditional on graduating from professional high school, we have the prob-
ability of choosing
• General early higher education: P s,GH13,it =
exp
(
V
s,GH1
it
)
exp
(
V
s,GH1
it
)
+exp
(
V
s,TH1
it
)
+exp
(
V
w,PL
it
) ,
• Technical early higher education: P s,TH13,it =
exp
(
V
s,TH1
it
)
exp
(
V
s,GH1
it
)
+exp
(
V
s,TH1
it
)
+exp
(
V
w,PL
it
) ,
• Labor market: Pw,PL3,it =
exp
(
V
w,PL
it
)
exp
(
V
s,GH1
it
)
+exp
(
V
TH1
)
+exp
(
V
w,PL
it
) .
At the end of general higher education (grade 1), we have the probability of
choosing
• General higher education (grade 2): P s,GH24,it =
exp
(
V
s,GH2
it
)
exp
(
V
s,GH2
it
)
+exp
(
V
w,GH1
it
) ,
• Labor market: Pw,GH14,it =
exp
(
V
w,GH1
it
)
exp
(
V
s,GH2
it
)
+exp
(
V
w,GH1
it
) .
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At the end of technical higher education (grade 1), we have the probabilities
to choose
• General higher education (grade 2): P s,GH25,it =
exp
(
V
s,GH2
it
)
exp
(
V
s,GH2
it
)
+exp
(
V
w,TH1
it
) ,
• Labor market: Pw,TH15,it =
exp
(
V
w,TH1
it
)
exp
(
V
s,GH2
it
)
+exp
(
V
w,TH1
it
) .
Finally, at the end of general higher education (grade 2), we have the prob-
ability of choosing
• General higher education (grade 3): P s,GH36,it =
exp
(
V
s,GH3
it
)
exp
(
V
s,GH3
it
)
+exp
(
V
w,GH2
it
) .
As attending higher education in grade 3 is the highest level in the model,
the probability of entering the labor market after completing this grade is
equal to the probability of graduating at that level, i.e. Pw,GH36 = P
s,GH3
6 .
• Labor market: Pw,GH26,it =
exp
(
V
w,GH2
it
)
exp
(
V
s,GH3
it
)
+exp
(
V
w,GH2
it
) .
In order to build the likelihood function of observed education outcomes and
trajectories, we now write down the probabilities of each schooling attainment
and distinguish on the basis of the path chosen. This set of probabilities defines
all possible educational trajectories that the data allow us to identify. To build
the likelihood, we define a vectorHi that records the highest grade attainment as
well as all relevant information relevant to individual trajectories. The following
list exhausts all possible outcomes for Hi.
• Drop-out: hDOit = Pw,DO1,it .
• General low level: hGLit = P s,GL1,it ∗ Pw,GL2,it .
• Professional low level: hPLit = P s,PL1,it ∗ Pw,PL3,it .
• General higher education level (grade 1) after general low level: hGLGH1it =
P s,GL1,it ∗ P s,GH12,it ∗ Pw,GH14,it .
• General higher education level (grade 1) after professional low level: hPLGH1it =
P s,PL1,it ∗ P s,GH13,it ∗ Pw,GH14,it .
• Technical higher education level (grade 1) after general low level: hGLTH1it =
P s,GL1,it ∗ P s,TH12,it ∗ Pw,TH15,it .
• Technical higher education level (grade 1) after professional entry level:
hPLTH1it = P
s,PL
1,it ∗ P s,TH13,it ∗ Pw,TH15,it .
• General higher education level (grade 2) after general early HE: hGHEGH2it =
P s,GL1,it ∗ P s,GH12,it ∗ P s,GH24,it ∗ Pw,GH26,it .
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• General higher education level (grade 2) after technical early HE: hTHEGH2it =
P s,GL1,it ∗ P s,TH12,it ∗ P s,GH25,it ∗ Pw,GH26,it .
• General higher education level (grade 3) after general early HE: hGHEGH3it =
P s,GL1,it ∗ P s,GH12,it ∗ P s,GH24,it ∗ Pw,GH36,it .
• General higher education level (grade 3) after technical early HE: hTHEGH3it =
P s,GL1,it ∗ P s,TH12,it ∗ P s,GH25,it ∗ Pw,GH36,it .
C Parameter Estimates
Table 20: Schooling Consumption Value Parameter Estimates: Utility Shifters
Estimate (S.E.)
Switching sector utility shifters
From professional to general sector (δGP ) -1.343 (0.166)
From professional to technical sector (δTP ) 0.099 (0.156)
From technical to general sector (δGT ) -0.092 (0.027)
Grade level utility shifters
Attending general early higher education (δG1 ) -0.226 (0.059)
Attending general intermediate higher education (δG2 ) 1.741 (0.279)
Attending general advanced higher education (δG3 ) -1.733 (0.050)
Note: Standard errors under parenthesis.
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Table 23: Wage Equations Parameter Estimates: Grade Level Wage Shifters
Estimate (S.E.)
Dropping-out from high school (ψDO) -0.192 (0.004)
Attending general early higher education (γG1 ) 0.011 (0.003)
Attending general intermediate higher education (γG2 ) 0.098 (0.003)
Attending general advanced higher education (γG3 ) 0.345 (0.004)
Note: Standard errors under parenthesis.
Table 24: Wage Equations Parameter Estimates: Standard Deviation of Error
Terms
Estimate (S.E.)
High school drop-out 0.186 (0.001)
General high school 0.138 (0.001)
Professional high school 0.132 (0.001)
General early higher education 0.155 (0.003)
Technical early higher education 0.169 (0.001)
General intermediate higher education 0.150 (0.001)
General advanced higher education 0.175 (0.001)
Note: Standard errors under parenthesis.
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